Who started the Korean War?

I have many written many articles on this issue. I will post them when I have time. Let us start with the story you will never hear from others.

June 4, 1950

written (2000.7.22) webpaged (20013.7.17)

Apparently there still is the question of who started the Korean war, and many people still ask me what my opinion is on this question. This question should not exist because there were about 50,000 Korean troops stationed along the 38th parallel on 25th day of June 1950. Many died on that day, but many survived and told their horror stories, and they are still telling the story.

Two Chinese delegates (left) and three North Korean delegates at the first cease-fire talk held in Kaesong. The tall man in the middle is Gen. Nam Il, the chief delegate. On his left (short man) is Lee Sang-Jo.

Lee Sang-Jo was a high-ranking officer in the North Korean Army and was one of the Northern delegates during the Panmunjom cease-fire negotiations which lasted for two years (1952-53). Later, he had a quarrel with Kim Il-Sung and exiled himself to Minsk (Belarus). When he visited Korea about ten years ago, Korean reporters asked him who started the war. His reply was "Why are you asking me this question? You already know. If you still do not know, ask those Koreans who were at the front line on the 6.25 day."

About one month ago (June 2000), I attended a dinner hosted by the Washington chapter of the SNU Alumni Association, and the keynote speaker was an SNU man working at the Korean Embassy in Washington. He was invited to speak about the government's plan for reunification. Before explaining the plan, he said he has done some research on who started the Korean War and spent 20 minutes to explain his research result.

He said he was born in 1950 and the information he has is based on publications. He said the outbreak of the war shocked the entire world, and he presented an impressive list of the newspaper and broadcast reports during the period 6.25-29. He was bragging about the his research on Soviet news reports. His conclusion was that the question is still at large, and will never be settled. This is precisely what we expect from SNU people. They never know how to learn things from fellow Koreans. If he is so interested in this question, why did he not ask Koreans who were at the front line on the 25th day of June 1950?

Chang Do-Young became the army chief in 1961. He was not able to stop Park Chung-Hee's military take-over in May of 1961. He sincerely apologized this in his memoir.
In June of 1950, he was the chief of the army intelligence bureau. He made an inspection tour to the 38th parallel on Sunday June 4. He heard from the field commanders that North Koreans were building a road toward the south at a rapid pace, but he was not able to see the purpose of the road.
The road was for their Soviet-built T-34 tanks scheduled to come to Seoul on June 29. He did not make an apology for this, because he did not keep what he heard there in his memory cells.
How do I know this? I was there to hear the conversation. I also met him several times in the United States.

As for myself, I was on the 38th parallel just north of Seoul on the fourth day of June (three weeks before the 6.25 day). I accompanied my father who went there. He was a high-ranking supply officer at Korea's Ministry of Defense, and was a member of the inspection team headed by Col. Chang Do-Young who was the chief intelligence officer.
The team's mission was to find out what was going on at the 38th parallel. I listened carefully what field officers were telling to the inspection team. The soldiers there do not have enough ammunition for their rifles even for target practices.
Col. Chang asked field commanders what was going on in the North? They were constructing a road toward the boundary. What was the purpose of the road? They had no idea. This was the end of the conversation about the road.
The Korean army, including its intelligence chief, did not have enough military professionalism to analyze this crucial information. They did not know the purpose was to move their tanks rapidly from their hidden points in the North. Tanks were far beyond their imagination.
The only thing they knew about the Northern army was that they were equipped with hand-operated Mosin-Nagant rifles designed by Russians in 1891. Their conclusion was that they were safe as long as they had enough supply of ammunition for their semi-automatic M1 refiles. They did not know rifles (automatic or otherwise) are irrelevant against the tanks.
M1 Garand for the South (top), and Mosin-Nagant for the North. Which one is superior? This is a useless question in tank warfares.
When I tell this story to young Koreans, their answer is that they were not born in 1950, and they cannot agree with me. I sometimes meet Koreans from the North when I go to Russia. They become scared if I tell them I look like Kim Il-Sung. On the other hand, they become very friendly as soon as I speak with Pyongyang accent (my mother was from Pyongyang). Then we get into the argument on who started the Korean war. When I tell them I was at the tank-crossing point three weeks before the 6.25 day, they ask me how old I was. They are at least willing to listen.
A similar situation exists on the question of who wrote the first Korean version of the Bible. This question is not restricted to Christianity in Korea. The Bible played an important role in teaching Koreans how to use Hangeul. On this question also, Korean scholars always rely on foreign publications, and they will never find the answer. Click here for a story.
Koreans do not know how to ask questions and listen to fellow Koreans. This is the most serious tragedy for Korea. Unless we solve this problem, we will never earn respects from other people in the world. If we do not respect ourselves, how can we expect them to respect us?
Let us reconstruct where those tanks were when Chang's inspection team went to the 38th parallel on June 4, 1950.
1. Before 1944, there was an elite Japanese combat unit called the 77th Regiment, called "Chilsip-Chil Yondae" in Korean. This word in quite familiar among those who lived in Pyongyang or had relatives there. Here is a photo of its military base. This place was used by Soviet troops after 1945, but became the No. 1 military base for the North Korean army after Soviets left in 1948.
2. On February 8, 1848, the North Korean army (called Chosun Inmin-Goon) was inaugurated with Kim Il-Sung as the commander in Chief. But the training program for their tank operators and air force pilots began much earlier.
3. In June of 1950, those tanks were assembled on the ground of the 77th Regiment. I met several people who saw those tanks there. They are among those Korans who came to the South during the 1.4 retreat of 1951.
4. I also met one person who came from Sariwon. He saw the tanks being transported to south on railroad cars. It was done during daytimes. Sariwon is a major railroad crossing point south of Pyonyang. It now serves as the capital city of North Hwanghae Province.
It was thus inexcusable for the (south) Korean army not to be able to detect these signals of war before the 6.25 day. To make things worse, one third of the front-line soldiers were sent home during the weekend of the 6.25 day to help their parents in farmlands. For the officers, they had a big party to celebrate the inauguration of the officers' club at the army headquarters in the evening and late night of June 24, while North Koreans were loading their guns. Those high-ranking officers were drunk when they heard the war news.

June 25-30, 1950

In 1950, KBS (Korean Broadcasting System) operated with three transmitters. Its medium-wave (970 khz) main transmitter was 50 KW strong, and was able to cover the entire Korean peninsula and southern Manchu. It also had two 1-KW short-wave transmitters, one with 2.51 mhz and the other with 3.975 mrz. From the technical point of view, the KBS was a very powerful station. However, Koreans could not provide interesting radio programs. Thus, the morning program stopped at 8.00 AM, and the day-time program started at 12.00 noon and lasted for only one hour until 1:00 PM.
On Sunday, June 25, at 1:00 PM, the KBS announcer (Yoon Young-Ro) said the broadcasting would stay on, and the station kept sending out military marches. At 1:11 PM, the announcer gave an important news: North Korean army units crossed the 38th line. The news also said the Soviet-built tanks were leading the army units on the Dong-Duchun front, directly north of Seoul.
Immediately after the war news on June 25, the KBS radio was telling how bravely our army was fighting, and the unification of the country would be accomplished within a week. However, the atmosphere was quite different. The re-enforcement troops going to the front line were equipped with the 99-style Japanese rifles, and their faces were quite grim. They ran out of the ammunition for their M-1 rifles.
Three weeks earlier on Sunday, June 21, I accompanied my father who was one of the members of the team who went to the Dong-Duchun front to inspect the situation there. He was a high-ranking navy officer in charge of logistics at the ministry of defence. The head of the inspection team was Colonel Chang Do-Young. The members were quite relaxed and attempted to get alcoholic verbiages during their lunch hour at a local restaurant. However, the restaurant owner said it was illegal to provide alcohols during the day time.
At that time, the 7th Division of the Korean army was guarding the 38th line there. I spotted a couple of machine gun posts, and nothing of military significance.
On Monday, June 26, we all went to school, and our school principal gave a long sermon about how we should behave during the war environment. He was talking about German students in their classrooms while bombs were dropping outside. He did not know what was going to happen next day.
On Tuesday, June 27, the situation became grave. We were all sent back from the school in the morning. In the early evening of June 27, two North Korean fighers (YAK-9) flew over Seoul and dropped leaflets, telling they will liberate the citizens of Seoul from American imperialism. Yet, the KBS radio was reporting how bravely our troops are fighting and scoring battle successes. Furthermore, the radio saied the city of Haeju (in the north) was occupied completely by our 17th Regiment from Ongin.
Shin Sung-Mo in the middle. With him were Chae Byung-Duk (left) and Chung Il-Kwon. This photo was taken in July of 1950 when Chung replaced Chae as the army chief.
In the early morning of June 28, Shin Sung-Mo, the defense minister, made a special announcement saying that the NK army came close to Seoul, and the Korean government was moving to Suwon, 100 km south of Seoul.
My family sensed that the Han-Gang River could be a good defense line, and moved to our friend's house at No-Ryang-Jin (south of the river) on June 28. In the morning of June 29, around 4.00 AM, we heard two giant explosions. The Hangang bridges were destroyed. We then walked all the way to Suwon. After spending one night there, we were waiting for a train to Dae-Jun on June 30.
While waiting for the train, we saw a big four-engined American plane approaching the Suwon airport. Then we heard machine-gun noise. I did not know what was going on at that time. Later, I learned that Gen. Douglas MacArthur was coming from Tokyo on his plane called "Bataan." A North Korean Yak-9 fighter was attempting to shoot down Mac's plane. The F-80 jets of the U.S.Air Force were chasing away the NK Yak fighter. I think I am the only one to see this scene and to tell the story in detail.

Day of Confusion (June 28, 1950)

In the early morning of June 28, 1950, Shin Sung-Mo (defense minister) made a statement saying that the North Korean troops approached the northern boundary of Seoul, and the citizens became horrified. Shortly after his statement, the radio said Shin's statement was in error, and the our defense of Seoul is iron-clad. The radio kept saying that our brave troops were chewing up the troops of the NK puppet regime.
Choe Yong-Gon (1900-1976), with Kim Il-Sung (1951). He built his military experience while in the Chinese communist army.
In the meantime, the NK troops were consolidating their positions in the Miari hills at the northern boundary of Seoul. The commander of their troops was Choe Yong-Gon, who was a experienced military man. Instead of marching into Seoul during the day time, he wanted to avoid street fighting. He wanted to let all South Korean troops run away to the south on June 28, and march into the Seoul in darkness during the night of June 28-29. Indeed, they did. The citizens of Seoul saw NK tanks in the morning of June 29.
When the defense minister was making his statement in the morning of June 28 that the capital city would be moved to Suwon, President Yi Seung-Mann was already on a train heading toward Daejun. He was desperate to open a appropriate channel to the president of the United State. The only way to save him and his country was to bring in American troops stationed in Japan.
I did not hear, but I heard from others saying that he broadcasted a message saying that Soul would be defended. I also heard that Lady Mo Yoon-Sook read her poem toward the NK soldiers to stop fighting and killing.

During the day time of June 28, I was tuned to the KBS radio. Perhaps, I am the only one who could tell what the radio sent out. My family crossed the Hangang bridge to south in the early evening of June 28.

This photo was taken in Kharkov (Ukraine). I look OK with a lady, soldiers, and a T-34 tank.
Kharkov is an Ukrainian city where the Soviet engineers developed their T-34 tanks. While Kharkov was occupied by German troops during World War II, Soviets moved their tank factory to an Ural-mountain city of Chelyabinsk, where they mass-produced those T-34 tanks. With those tanks, Soviets scored a decisive victory over the German army at the Kursk (south of Moscow) tank battle of 1943. From there, Germans started losing the war. Here is my photo with one of the Kursk veterans.
Stalin initially gave 200 of those T-34 tanks to Kim Il-Sung in 1948. They showed up in Seoul in the morning of June 29, 1950.
I once went out with a Russian young lady whose grandmother worked at the tank factory in Chelyabinsk during World War II. It was an out-door factory. Soviets did not have enough time and resources to construct the factory buildings.

On June 28, 1950. North Korean troops with their T-34 tanks were assembling on the northern suburb of Seoul, in preparation for their entry to the city during the dark hours of June 28-29. The (south) Korean government abandoned the city and moved to Suwon. The Seoul radio station was manned by the chief announcer named Yoon Young-Ro and Col. Kim Hyun-Soo who was the chief public relations officer of the army.
Since there were no good news to tell, these two people had to make up stories, and played one of the Sousa marches between those incoherent stories. Like to hear that music?
It was the National Fencibles March by John Philip Sousa.
1. Video 1 (from a Sousa collection)
2. Video 2 (another Sousa collection)
3. Video 3 (orchesta version)
4. Video 4 (Arlington High School).
5. Video 5 (Saddleback High School)
6. Video 6 (Chino High School)
7. Video 7 (John F. Kennedy High School)
8. Video 8 (Cypress High School)
Both Mr. Yoon and Col. Kim were gunned down by the North Korean troops who came to the radio station in the early morning of June 29, 1950.

Two Infantry Divisions of the U.S. Army

The first group of GIs to come to Daejon (July 1950). They came with toy guns against Soviet-built T-34 tanks.

This first group was headed by Lt. Col. Charles Smith. I saw him at a Korean barber shop in Daejon. I was waiting for my turn, and he was waiting for his. The barber gave him the priority ahead of Korean customers.
How do I know he was the man? I still remember seeing his rank badge. I learned later that the group was called the Smith Task Force headed by a lieutenant colonel. He was the only one with this rank in this first group of Americans.

By June 29, 1950, four days after the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel, the (south) Korean Army completely lost its combat capability. It is not difficult to understand how this happened if you see the photos of the tanks the North Korean Army had.
Then the United States re-assembled its 24th Division stationed in Japan and sent it to Korea in hurry. The troops of the 24th Div. brought with them six 2.36-in bazooka launchers and 40 rounds of ammunition. I saw those troops. Their calculation was that those North Korean invaders would become scared and would run away to the North.
When they met the North Korean tanks in Osan on July 5 (1950), they sent the first shots to the tanks, but nothing happened. To make things worse, those tanks did not even reciprocate the courtesy of returning the fire. You really have to see those unruly tanks by visiting this webpage. In the battle of Daejon, the 24th Div. lost one third of its troop strength including its division commander.
The division commander was Major General William Dean. He was captured by North Koreans and stayed at their POW camp until the POW exchange process following the cease-fire agreement of July 27, 1953.
In the meantime, the First Cavalry Division was on the Pacific Ocean on its way from Texas. The troops finally landed in Pohang on July 16. They then replaced the wounded 24th Division. Later, the First Cav. got combined with the 24th Div. and the First Div. of the Korean army into the First Corps of the U.N. Army.
You will then be interested in how Koreans got along with their American counterparts. I wrote an article about this problem in 1997, but decided to rewrite it in order to emphasize what I really want to say in these articles: Koreans have enough wisdom and strength to deal with discriminations if they exist. Please continue reading.

American Wheels and Korean Legs

I lived long enough to meet many interesting people. Among them are two US four-star generals. In December of 1953, I shook hands with General Maxwell Taylor who was the commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea at that time. I still have a photograph of the hand-shaking scene. I was in my high-school uniform and Taylor was in his combat fatigue.

Taylor later served as the Army Chief of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Ambassador to Vietnam during the Vietnam build-up period (before 1965). I was thus able to show off my photo with Taylor to American friends. When the friends asked me what the occasion was, I used to tell a lie that I destroyed one Soviet-built NK tank with a gasoline bottle. This was a joke, but some Americans believed my made-up story.

Gen. John Tilelli was the commanding general of the U.S. Forces in Korea (1996-99). In 1997, he came to the University of Maryland to give a speech. The tall on on his right was James Lilley (1928-2009) who was Ronald Reagan's Ambassador to Korea (1986-89). Lilley was on the faculty of the University of Maryland when Tilleli came in 1997. Tilleli was wearing the following insignia (First Cavalry Division) on his right arm.

The following story is equally unbelievable, but is a true story. I shook hands with another U.S. general last month. General John Tilelli is the present commander of the U.S. forces in Korea. He visited the University of Maryland on June 26 (1997). I am now old and high enough to exchange jokes with this four-star general, and I felt like "kihapping" his staff members consisting of colonels and majors.

On one of his side arms, General Tilelli was wearing an insignia for the U.S. First Cavalry Division (black horse on yellow background). This unit is now stationed in Fort Hood (Texas). If you are attending the Univ. of Texas in Austin, you should be able to spot the soldiers wearing the black-yellow insignia. In order to impress Tilelli, I told him that he should not be in Korea but should be in Texas.
He then said I am only half-smart about the U.S. Army. If a general carries enough stars, he can wear the unit insignia most meaningful to him. In his case, he was the commander of the First Cavalry when the unit was sent to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf-war period, and he was proud of the mission he carried out. Yes, the First Cavalry and the 24th Division formed the main muscle of the U.S. Army in the Gulf region in 1990 and 1991.

In October of 1950, the UN (US and Korean) forces were ready to march toward north to liberate Pyongyang, and the UN Command initially positioned the First Cav. and the 24th Division in the left flank and the right flank respectively, while leaving the first Korean Army Division as a reserve in the rear. This meant that Pyongyang was going to be occupied by American troops first. This was going to be a disaster to Koreans, and had to be prevented at all costs.

Pyongyang map of 1946

Major General Frank Milburn was the commander of the First UN Corps consisting of three army divisions in charge of occupying Pyongyang in October of 1950.
Brig. General Paik Sun-Yup was the commander of the Korean Army First Division. Paik is talking to Milburn in Pyongyang (October 1950).

Under a strong protest from Koreans, the 24th Div. was replaced by the First Korean Army Division, but it was beyond Americans' imagination for Koreans to reach Pyongyang before their Cav. Division. This Cav. Division was initially created as a fast-moving unit during the horse era, and maintained its mobility during the post-horse era. In Korea, the Division was equipped with more than 1,000 motor vehicles including state-of-the-art troop carriers. In contrast, the Korean Division had only 50 Nissan trucks (junk cars at that time).
The race was very simple. Americans are on the wheels and Koreans had to walk. This was how the six-day race began. I would not tell this story if the result had been consistent with what young Koreans could expect these days. Yes, Koreans at that time were creative enough to produce miracles. It was a torturous to walk and run without sleep for six days, but they reached Pyongyang before Americans did. Remember that hard work is an integral part of creativity.
The commander of the Korean Division was Paik Sun-Yup with one star at that time. Two years later, in 1952, he became the Army Chief of Staff. He then became Korea's first four-star general. In 1950, he explained to his troops why Koreans had to get to Pyongyang before Americans, and said loudly "I will walk and you will follow me."
Gen. Paik, who was initially trained as an officer in the Japanese army, never understood why soldiers had to wear neckties. Thus, he always came to ceremonies in his combat fatigue without necktie. He did not carry his pistol, but he always had his water canteen hanging on his belt. Koreans were then quick to produce a joke that Paik was not carrying water in his canteen, but wine or whisky. They nicknamed the canteen as "Paik Sun-Yup's Sool-tong." These days, it's official name is "Soo-tong," but our young soldiers do not know the history.
In 1985, I met a Korean army officer. In order to kihap him, I asked him why the canteen is called "Soo-tong" instead of a more natural word "Mool-tong." To my surprise, he had a clear understanding of its history. He told me he can tell the alcoholic content of the liquid inside by looking at the canteen. I asked him how. He was quite scientific in his explanation, but I do not know whether his theory works in the real world. He said he definitely can tell, and I had to trust him. Who says Koreans lack imagination?

copyright@2013 by Y. S. Kim.
Unless otherwise specified, all photos are from the public domain, the Wikipedia fair-use domain, the North Korean propaganda literature, or from my personal collection.

How did I talk to Einstein?

Click here for his home page.
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I received my PhD degree from Princeton in 1961, seven years after high school graduation in 1954. This means that I did much of the ground work for the degree during my high school years.